

about Hiroshima

Not to "get this right" at last -

is to confirm myth that US decision-makers
in May - August 1945 had scruples ^{or hesitation} about
general massacre of cities in war (unlike Hitler!)
as a wartime tactic

Especially - we didn't imitate Nazis (or Japanese?)
in use of torture, or shooting hostages (as to surgery!)
as an official practice

(and? unorg. shooting of prisoners)

but fire-bombing, area bombing of
cities during at night (concentrated,
except for shelters)

(map cars - at night)

(vs. ambulances, aid convoys,

war factories, ports)

It is to under-rate dangers in future:

even US - absence of scruples in wartime
democratic

ii - willingness to go to war despite the machines
& likelihood of massacre

- human characteristics being on display
war of WMD's

(survey: earthquake? (P.C.)

weather (VN)

(terrorism?)

BW

him. war

risk of all-out

Feb 2, 4 AM 2008

mainly belief

(2) that (a) there had been a consideration of,
argument for (or against), discussion of
"necessity" of war

^{only}
because (b) Bomb was seen as requiring
special justification, as requiring "argument,"
since it was otherwise (if not necessary)

Killer category

(not continuation
of VN war)

It was not

i) illegal

ii) immoral

But disagreeing — iii) dangerous, w/ot future and race (+ Cold War!)

does not imply

this — though comfortable

(Chi Physicists: NO one

suggested this to hst —

(but also with

Opposition/Conant

"if not handled
right" (?)

when Strasser is May (only)

Bomb? (Physicists, iiii)

NO ONE (tho) BELIEVED THIS.

NO ONE ARGUED OR SAW THAT IT HAD TO
BE "NECESSARY" (except for — justified by

PK think i, ii, iii all half-evident; ^{Strasser}

on contrary, iii not (though valid)

i, ii were not real issues of

Aug 1945

or earlier, for fire-bombing, seen even as
needed — significant, escalation; low-level
decisions, for practical reasons (including
German surrender, Mengele, not fully)

earlier theories of justification (about war,
^{whether} morally finally war, even including long
war — as argued after Hiroshima, finally,
as being absurd.

goes back to
last months
of WWI;

postwar
colonial wars,

Aug...

Feb 2, 4 AM DC

For PK on Hironaka:

There were statements after the war of many airmen
(+ civs) that the B-29s had not been "necessary"
to avoid invasion, or even to shorten the war
(central invasion, US losses were ^{going to be} small after
Okinawa — except for the Andromeda (Crews?)
no great pressure to shorten war Augustus?
except to avoid SU role in Japan)

No one except the (not part of decision process)
says he said ^{to Hst or...} "not ne." before Hironaka.

[Chi. 1st publication
Phygo. said (to) not to use it even if necessary:
didn't get to Hst or even Stimson).

But quoting these statements after war supports
the false impression that C. "th^{Hst} knew it was
(certainly not necessary"
or almost sure
or probably — though Hst, "Five Japs" with SU entry;
though Hst did say this, there was no record of anyone saying it
to him, (unless the replied) "Hst believed..." — did others?
except who spoke to Hst?

but also (2) (next page)

NOT Marshall,
Army

(as in paper, difference between

i.e. no one was entitled to be sure
beforehand, or even sure, that invasion

US Army plus Navy (Air
Corps)

[Who could say what was the prob / possibility
of a successful Army comp — which would
have demanded (or, resistance to Emperor,
Navy, foreign officer)
at least approval for
generals [or, will... involve, to avoid this?

X // USG wanted to avoid public attention on this desire to keep Emperor.
critical Base would help. V.A.s

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Monday Jan 28 08

Confine: yes, others in our position would do the same [no socialist paragon]
- be as bad or worse -

but we're the ones who've done it,
not one doing it

Our troops + C/A are only the Tiger-men;

but ~~they~~ are the Tiger-men.

Wh it comes to presentation, it may be unfair
to single them out

q: (Henderson, Falleron, Allen H. H. H.
Colley - for whom the word "schlemiel"
was invented.

Hansen; his girl-friends

prison guard: corrections officer (Hans)

Only 2 countries have ever Wish concerned or tried
to win a war of airpower alone (strategies)

only 1 the beliefs - enough - that it did so.

(really, in paper, navy?)

which islands were necessary to
blockade??

Some two - when they decided that air forces
could not hit the industrial targets they aimed at -
rather than the ground the (and, for UK, they no role
in 1942) intended to believe aiming at what they
could hit - civilian families (not, at work?)
hours hours

for SB, too

ESCHEWED

THREAT-USE

(mostly)

Some 2 - A-bomb, to be used abominably

X: FU

(not, there)